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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
T h i s ii|i''|*H "i I involves two cases which were consolidated. The 
principal parties I I I • two caiu'h i i . r > I • -. . . i\i 
Mail ? Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle who w 11 De referred to as 
• *• Federal Savings • 1 ri-• !-n;' • Association -^  Logan 
who wil] ..* referred to as FI i: s I: Federal 
Is a fraud/misrepresentation case in which Loosles are Plaintiffs 
in I IF hi Foi ir ' 1,11 11 II !. Ill M II » " K i l l l I "' * M ' 
:i i i the Box Elder County District Court . J 
w < - \ n<* referred aisrepresentation action The Trial 
* Federal i n t he 
misrepresentation action 1990; this Judgment w e 
referrer Summary Judgment. 
ill M l erl . *ii 
independent action against Loosles as Defendants Lu quiet title to 
certain watP1" ^ights. This action was filed 3ox Elder 
Count . .* . s 
;- q«. actior .ase No. 900000129QT was ultimately 
consolidate^ - f- :ase No. 890000213C£ ^ ( .
 ? on June ]• 
First Federa August , udgment wilj . *- referred 
as the Quiet w* + •• ^ judgment. 
Referen 
References * :.hf transcript will be by the letters Tr followed 
VT' emphasis *t\.** unless otherwise 
noted t • . 
1 
Federal against Loosles for a deficiency judgment following a Trust 
Deed foreclosure and a misrepresentation and fraud action by 
Loosles against All Pro Real Estate Incorporated, a Utah 
Corporation, Quality Building Incorporation, a Utah Corporation, 
and William C. Packer dba Quality Builders, the realtors and 
parties involved in Loosles' acquisition by exchange of the real 
property hereafter referenced. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Following are the issues presented to this Court for review 
and the standard for appellate review for each issue: 
1. Should Loosles' Brief be disregarded, the Trial Court 
decisions affirmed and/or the appeal dismissed with prejudice due 
to Loosles' failure to comply with Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and to cite to the record in the Brief? The standard for 
review is evaluation of the compliance and exercise of discretion 
as to sanctions. Uckerman v. Uckerman, 588 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1978). 
2. Did the Trial Court correctly grant First Federal's Motion 
For Summary Judgment (R. pp. 90-93) on Loosles' claims for 
misrepresentation? The Trial Court decided this issue as a matter 
of law on undisputed facts. The standard for review is for 
correctness. Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 
738 (Utah, 1990). Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah, 1989). 
3. Have Loosles met their burden of marshalling the evidence 
in support of the Trial Court's decision to quiet title to certain 
water rights in favor of First Federal and then showing that such 
2 
< * avorable to the Trial Court's 
decision, failed to sustain such decision? This is a question of 
fact and the standard of review "clearly erroneous" Rule 52[a], 
1 — i£— I v „ BMG Corporation, 7"!IU 
P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1985). 
S T A T 0 T E g jyjp R U L E g 
The following statutes and rules are subject to interpretation 
by this Court appeal: 
Rui-
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings 
below shall be supported by citations to the record. 
Rule 24(a)(9), URAP: 
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on, (Emphasis added)• 
Rule 24(e), URAP: 
References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement 
of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement 
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g), References to 
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is 
made to evidence and admissibility of which is i n 
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the 
transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected• 
URAP: 
Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
3 
§ 73-1-11, U.C.A., (1953 as amended): 
A right to the use of water appurtenant to land shall 
pass to the grantee of such land, andf in cases where 
such right has been exercised in irrigating different 
parcels of land at different times, such right shall pass 
to the grantee of any parcel of land on which such right 
was exercised next preceding the time of the execution of 
any conveyance thereof; . . . provided that any such 
right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may be 
reserved by the grantor in any such conveyance by making 
such reservation in express terms in such conveyance 
S 78-12-26, U.C.A., (1953, as amended): 
Within three years: 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action in such case 
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Rule 52(a), URCP: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially ... Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous ... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On or about May 4, 1989, Loosles filed a Complaint (R. pp. 
1-7) against Defendants First Federal and Hillam Abstracting 
claiming misrepresentation by First Federal and seeking to enjoin 
a foreclosure sale by First Federal and Hillam against real 
property owned by Loosle and pledged by Trust Deed to First Federal 
as Beneficiary with Hillam Abstracting as Trustee. Tr. Exhibit No. 
4 
2* On or about June 3 , .1  989 the Court granted Loosles' 
request for ari injunction stopping the sale, sublet* 
bond. h i i Loosle failed to pos t the required bond 
^scheduled and held the foreclosure sale on 
July 25, 1989. 
On October the Trial Court granted First Federal 
ijti i in- I I i uifi 11 I 111 ii deficiency 
remaining after the foreclosure sale and First Federal tiled the 
Counterclaim against Loosles, I ,, |' p. -I B I"1*, 5( -64. • 
I ln» "I i I,I I I " V H 1 1 I s 
permitting Loosle; amend their Complaint and to add additional 
party Defendants (the realtors and grantors involved in Loosles' 
n\ about Marc redeui filed 
independent action against Loosles (Civil No. 900000129QT) to quiet 
property which subject of i * foreclosure 
hearing * M * ' I •* ; M* - Court ordered 
that 
signed the Order April 
3 ' On Apri] 1990, Loosle? f : < ^  M ^ Amended Complai nt 
naming ciis i.nli I i *, 
Quality Builders Incorporated, and William . acker d/b/a Quali»y 
Builders (hereafter collectively "Packer
 ;. k. ^ p . 166-174. 
5 
8. On April 5, 1990, the Box Elder County Sheriff served 
Quality Builders, All Pro Real Estate and William L. Packer. R. 
pp. 178-180. 
9. Pursuant to First Federal's and Hillam's Motion For 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Complaint in the misrepresentation, 
on May 17, 1990, the Trial Court signed the Order dismissing 
Loosles' Amended Complaint against First Federal and HiiLam 
Abstracting. R. pp. 194-199. 
10. On May 21, 1990, Loosles filed their first Notho Of 
Appeal in this matter which was dismissed by the Supreme Coui_t on 
August 20, 1990. R. pp. 202-203. 
11. After a trial on June 15, 1990 of First Federal's quiet 
title action, the Trial Court signed Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law and a Judgment And Decree on August 1, 1990 
determining all water rights issues between First Federal and 
Loosles in First Federal's favor as initially raised in Civil No. 
900000129QT. R. pp. 302-317. 
12. On August 31, 1990, Loosle filed a second Notice Of 
Appeal of the Summary Judgment previously appealed and of the quiet 
title matters determined August 1, 1990. R. pp. 324-325. 
13. On October 18, 1990, the Supreme Court dismissed Loosles' 
second appeal and on November 5, 1990 remitted the case to the 
District Court. 
14. On or about October 29, 1990, Loosles requested Rule 
54(b) certification; and on November 7, 1990 the Trial Court signed 
6 
mi i n 1 in 1 i c 1 i i i ' i 1 a i in HIM j in mi in i M a y mi , in in'i mi I in mi in I (in ii> mi in , mi i  imil - j u d g m e n t s 
a s f i n a l I l: i: »p 3 3 3 - 3 3 5 . 
15. On November 13, 1990, Loosles filed their third Notice c t 
Appeal. R. pp. 
about November 21, 1990, First Federal filed a 
Motion * : ismiss the appeal because of * matters still pending 
i n t< )istrie 
which the Supreme Court denied on December 
S T A T E M E | | T Q F g A C T S 
In 1980 Loosles owned a home in Perry, Box Elder County, 
lit ah. 
Loosles contacted realtor Kevin Packer 
regarding a home anc J acres of real property for sale located 
i nafter mentioned as the "Harper 
Ward Property" Property"). Mr. Packer was a neighbor and 
friend. Marlin Loosle Deposition, 1989 (hereafter "M.Li. Dep I9fl ( ,» 
- II I i "' I I'M III" I I in "I i -I I I i l e f e i i 1 ! I • ' ! " \ p r ± I 
1990 D e p o s i t i o n J ;• r e f e r e n c e d by 1990) 
i-r^i* p r i c e f o r t h e Harper Wara r o p e r t y was 
II "Ii III " I , | i II , II i II ' i 
After | ui l lu i'i- n I j wi-ok period and numerous 
visits •••• Property, Loosles decided to acquire the Harper Ward 
mi H,I 1 11 n i I" 11 I l i t f H | i i i I , Perry . 
Loosles executed ait Earnest Money Receipt And Offer To Purchase on 
September 10, 1980 a**~ -_ ..as accepted by the exchanging 
7 
Seller/Buyer, Quality Builders, Inc. on September 11, 1980. There 
was no negotiation of price whatsoever, either of the value of the 
home in Perry or of the value placed on the home in Harper Ward. 
M.L. Dep«, 1989, p. 14, lines 8-25; p. 22, lines 22-25; p. 23, 
lines 1-16; p. 28, lines 20-23. 
5. Loosles previously owned homes in Arizona, Colorado, 
Texas, and Perry, Utah, and never dickered or negotiated purchase 
or selling prices - they always paid for or sold at the asking 
price. See M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 23, lines 1-17. 
6. Loosles felt their realtors, All-Pro Realty, represented 
them in the transaction. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 15, lines 14-17. 
Loosles trusted their realtors ("our neighbor and friend", M.L. 
Dep., 1989, p. 9, lines 13-16, Jeff Packer and Kevin Packer . . . 
"And I felt he (Kevin) was pretty knowledgeable. And being a 
neighbor and going to church with him every week, you know, we 
didn't doubt what he was saying was so." M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 15, 
lines 23-24. 
7c Plaintiff Marlin Loosle is an aerospace engineer with a 
B.S. degree in manufacturing engineering. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 4, 
lines 7-8. 
8. Marlin Loosle relied on the real estate people as to the 
price being fair when he exchanged his home in Perry. M.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 6, lines 22-23. "I relied on them for the value of the 
house and the condition of the house and everything." M.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 7, lines 6-7. 
8 
9. & was what 
If was selling »» *ras worth 
Q. Did yon i believe =•- accept that? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Did yo 
A. Yes. 
Did you talk about value : the home with anyone 
other than Kevin or Jeff Packer? 
A. No. . , 
Theresa Loosle estimony ; almost identical. Theresa Loosle 
Deposit (hereafter 1989" 
Depositioi referenced by ig#y 
Is referenced by 1990), p. >', lines 4- M. 
1
 ^xchanqe for the Harper Ward Property were 
that Loosles would trade * Builders, inc . cosies' 
home Perry Quality Builder *i •_; assume the 
juie. 
Loosles would obtai secured by Harper 
Ward Property, the proceeds of which were be paid :< Quality 
I 1 1 I 1 1 1 
Harper Ward Property, P1.li. Iini 1989, Dep. Exhibit 
Loosles and/or the realtor contacted Paul Petersen, who 
hil l f f i r v r f u r F i i i s ! l '""pi lrr. i l i n hi i- j l tum (""* 1 I! y Il l <ili 
regarding borrowing the $67,000.00 that Loosles had agreed Lt pay 
Lo Quality Builders, M.I. Dep , 19 89, Depi, Exhibit Nos '" and »• 
"I. I" ill,!!11 i ( i p i H 0 \ i'"I:ii'l i l l ' l i l I t--J< ' l i t i J I 
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed secured by the Harper Ward Property 
9 
on September 16, 1980 for the benefit of First Federal. M.L. Dep., 
1989, Dep. Exhibit Nos. 5, 8 and 9. 
13. The principal amount of the Note was $67,000.00 with 
interest at twelve and three-quarters percent (12-3/4%) per annum 
and monthly payments of $728.00. M.L. Dep., 1989, Dep. Exhibit No. 
8. 
14. Loosles knew nothing at the time of the September, 1980 
closing of an appraisal of the Property done by First Federal in 
the sum of $87,000.00 and never saw the appraisal until 1988. M.L. 
Dep., 1989, p. 43, lines 1-17. 
15. Loosles made regular monthly payments on the Note and 
Trust Deed from October, 1980 through August, 1988. M.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 61, lines 21-24. In April or May, 1988, Loosles went into 
First Federal's Brigham City Office to inquire about refinancing 
the Property. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 56, lines 3-7. As part of the 
refinancing, First Federal obtained an appraisal valuing the 
Property as of May 23, 1988 at $63,500.00. M.L. Dep., 1989, 
Exhibit No. 3. On or about June, 1988, Loosles obtained a second 
appraisal on the Property estimating its value as of 1988. M.L. 
Dep., 1989, p. 42, lines 1-5. Shortly after obtaining the 1988 
appraisals, Loosles defaulted in their payments on the loan 
obligation and a Notice Of Default was filed on February 2, 1989 by 
Hillam as Trustee of the Trust Deed. Tr. Exhibit No. 7. 
16. The Deed of Trust signed by the Loosles, which was 
subject of the foreclosure, provided as part of the pledge and 
conveyances 
10 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and 
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply 
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and 
profits, water . water rights, and water stock, and all 
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, aii 
of which, including replacements and additions thereto, 
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property 
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing, 
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if 
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred 
to as the "Property" Tr Exhibit No 6 
] 7 The water used i n connection with the Harper Ward 
:.] was; a sp ri i 1 ::j :ii m m e d :I a t e ] ] t :> tl i = • • i \ \ I Il i \ 11 Il i 1 1 f; i <r m I 1  
home (hereafter the "Loosle Spring i ocated 
Property. The spring was the only source ilinary and 
i ! i d r q i i i I i i "i i mi (" 
exchange the Property. Tr. n*-s l II 
18. on March 23, 1983, Loosles, along with Thomas Calvin 
Thorpe, Vonda rhorpe^ i i :: i l R Ci ir ti s ai i I Barbar a 11? Ci :i r til s 
(neighbors) entered into a verbal and written agreemer* to each pay 
-
 :
- rovide certain labor to joi nt\ v drill a well to 
serve each ..n.* | 1) parties' homes and real property, the 
well r«- located on land owned by the Curtises, near each of the 
|irt • i i l.ousles performed substantial trenching and 
installed piping from the wel I. I n the Property, The well arx -q 
uccessful and thereafter Thomas Thorpe filed Water 
•.,. > ; >: in 7 ?'• 1 ?H ? 7 " in | m i I in • I 
19-25 lines i I,, p. U,, lines b-i! Exhibit Nos, 
11 
19. On or about January 21, 1982 Thomas C. Thorpe, on behalf 
of Loosles, Von R. Curtis and Thomas C. Thorpe, filed Water Right 
No. 29-2775 for the use of an underground water well for three (3) 
families. The State Engineer approved the Application To 
Appropriate. While the well right is in the name of Thomas C. 
Thorpe, certain other agreements were executed between the parties 
reflecting their actual agreement and understanding. Tr. p. 19, 
lines 1-6; p. 37, lines 6-25, Exhibit Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
20. On or about May 18, 1988, Loosles filed a request to 
appropriate spring water for irrigation and stockwatering from the 
Loosle Spring. That application had not been acted upon by the 
State Engineer at the time of Trial. Tr. p. 20, lines 14-19, 
Exhibit No. 14. 
21. Based on the current plumbing and line connections, the 
well water from the Thorpe Well and the spring water from the 
Loosle Spring, are the only sources of culinary water to the home. 
Tr. p. 52, lines 7-25; pp. 46-49. 
22. The well water has been the sole source of culinary water 
utilized in the home since 1982 and is the only acceptable culinary 
water source and is critical to the use and value of the Property. 
Tr. p. 52, lines 7-25. 
23. First Federal was the successful bidder on the Property 
at the Trustee's Sale held July 25, 1989. Tr. Exhibit No. 23. 
24. The Trustee's Deed to First Federal on the Property and 
water rights provided: 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all improvements. rights. 
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appurtenances,
 r e n t S / royalties# mineral oil and gas 
rights and profits, water. water rights and water stock, 
and al 1 fixtures now or hereafter attached to the 
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed, 
without warranty as to title. Tr. Exhibit No. 23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ill in in > » i v e d i ' i M II n l IIIIIII in I I in in ii II |i in in I III I in mi in in in I 1 11 I In • r < IIIIIII in mi ill In 
first is that Loosies' Bi lei is totally devoid oi references tu the 
Record or the Transcript and fails to comply with the Utah Rules of 
A p p e l l r i l i ' l1 i i in I H I U I j i • i in in III I II IIIIIII i.( H \ me "ill II Illy I I n I III i i i i l l I IIIIIII II l i n l q i i i i M i l i IIIIIII II 
be affirmed or the appeal dismissed with prejudice. 
Fi r s l l l I  ITM' in I III Hi iKtjin-f'i I III ill I In l'i i i I renin I, c o r r e c t l y 
q r rtiii i mi b u m m d i i| IIIIIII in jitu1 in i IIII I I K J I I I H I I I  II I II II I I in i h i v\\\ e h H i n ill i in. 
The i i n c o n t r o v e r t e d t e s t i m o n y of L o o s i e s a s c i t e d h e r e i n and t o t h e 
T r i a l Cour t Hhows I he rn c o u l d hniim horn iini IIII I I ^ p r e s e n t a t i o n from 
I i i ii I F e d e r a l and inn i i j l id i icu li| I joobJc • I i i n nil M|IIHI I i in is I eh * 
b e l a t e d c l a i m t h a t F i r s t F e d e r a l ' s a p p r a l s d l i s e r r o n e o u s Loos 1 **s 
lhn«pw I I 111 1 in mi I  I I I ill I Ii i | i p r a L s d l l o r e i y l i l | H ) y c n i r s f i t t e r c l o s i n c i 
L o o s i e s want lentJeih tu be g u a r a n t o r s u l p iopu iLy v a l u e r , h i > I i « 
p r o v i d e d no e v i d e n c e w h a t s o e v e i In t h e "Trial C o u r t nor do 1 hey 
I III I iv in i Ii' my M ii I illi mi in in iiii I III mi mi B r i e f I III ill F i i • I F e d e r a l made any 
untrue representations* to Lousier, thai. Loonies itiliud upon it and 
euen i ( L.oosles relied en First Federal's appraisal l.oosleb 
I mi i iv i lien | III i iii MI in "e l i ir v l Fpdn»i*(i I 1 'I IIIIIII i i p p r a i s«n I WAS win iiimj. 
I i t i o s l e h OWJI t e s t i m o n y s a y s I h e y h a v e n o i a u b t i o t a c t i o n a n d I h e i r 
b r i e f r a i s e s n o q u e s t i o n w i t h the? T r i a l C o u r t ' .n u r d i ' i III1 p p I'M 
I "ll'l Iwn inn i I I In I I  mi mi I I mi mi I II II in I i f " ! i II m e t II i IIIIIII 1 III i I D a s i n , 
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First Federal argues the statute of limitations bars Loosles 
action. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
Decree entered August 1, 1990 in the quiet title action were 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. R. pp. 302-317. 
This evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the Trial 
Court's ruling, establishes the intent to have water rights 
appurtenant to the Property and pledged to First Federal. Loosles 
have failed to marshall the evidence sustaining this Judgment by 
the Court and to show that such evidence does not sustain the 
Court's Judgment. Failing so to do, the Judgment of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
First Federal also requests attorney's fees in defending this 
appeal either because of the contractual provisions of the 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed between Loosles and First Federal or 
because of the failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Tr. Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
LOOSLES' BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, RULES 24(a)(7). 24(a)(9), 24(e), AND 
24 (k) BECAUSE IT PROVIDES NO REFERENCE WHATEVER TO THE 
TRIAL COURT RECORD AND PROCEEDINGS, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED OR LOOSLES' APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, 
Rule 24(a)(7), URAP provides: 
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings 
below shall be supported by citations to the record. 
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xvuxe 24 (a) (! ' R \ 1" provides : 
The argument snail contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on. 
A nd Rul e 24(e), URAP further provi des : 
References ,ahii I I In1 made • to tl le pages of Iiii le original 
record as jjajxiiiilc J pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement 
of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement 
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to 
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference Is 
made to evidence and admissibility of which is in 
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of th^ 
transcript at which the evidence was i denti fied -
and received or rejected. 
Rule 24(k), URAP states: 
Brief b vi  IIII fh are not in i umpl iance may be 
disregarded or sti i '"Ilk n, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court, and the coui I II ny assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
II 1 1 1 I K I! Il I I i l l II I I II I ' l l I II I I I II I II III I 1 1 1 ! I i C J I I I I II , II I I I [ I I I L | [ H I S i Il 
(in a p p e a l J S in I rame and a r t i c u l a t e i s s u e s L o o s l e s " B r i n l 
n e i t h e r f rames nm u t i c u l a t e s and makes n moaTiinqful r e s p o n s e by 
I iirhlll N-MJetdl ui'iv d i l l II n i l I I ILnobloij L J I U d Roply HiJt . l aiiiinl 
s u d d e n l y p r o v i d e numerous c i t a t i o n s t o I he r e c o r d a s t h e b a s i s tor 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , F i r s t F e d e r a l i i |i I  an i il in ii I i ill HI I I i,1 u n f a i r 
| in ' i i l i mi, in I I it 1 ii i I  in | IliiiiiJ i ippoi t umi ty lu l o p l y l.u t.ht.1 ban in 
The c o n t e n t s ot t h e L o o s l e s ' B r i e f a r c c o n s i s t e n i in t e rms nt 
iion-comp 1 i a n c o w i t h Ri I 1 oa ? 4 ( a ) ( " ) „ 1 1 | i ) | ' I | a n d 2 4 | i > | I T R A P : 
mi mi m m j L i mi II IIII iii'j o cee i i i nys u r u L e r e n c e s I Ltie r e c o r d , 
f" R e l e v a n t F a c t h . . . . NO r e f e r e n c e s In t h e r e c o r d . 
J . Summary of Argument Wo r p f e r o n n o n il 11 I I i i « 1 1 1 iIIII 
I ""i 
4. Argument. No references to the record. 
5. Conclusion No references to the record. 
The Addendum to the Loosle Brief is neither incorporated by 
reference nor cited. Issues cannot be framed absent reference to 
a record that shows certain facts were in evidence and considered 
by the Trial Court. Then the Supreme Court can evaluate the law 
and the facts. But absent a showing of where the facts relied upon 
are to be found in the record there are no issues. As the Court of 
Appeals stated in Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App., 
1991): 
Appellants' brief contains . . . no citations to the 
record, no legal authorities and no analysis whatsoever. 
Their brief is not in compliance with our rules which 
require the brief of the appellant to contain an 
argument. . . Thus, we decline to address this issue and 
assume the correctness of the judgment below. . . At 72. 
Further, appellants challenge is that the trial court's 
finding is unsupported by the evidence in the record. 
But, appellants have failed to marshal the evidence as 
required by our standard of review . . . At 73. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court dealt with this same issue in 
Tofova v. Tofova, 500 P.2d 409 (N.M., 1972), when it specifically 
held: 
There is not one single reference to a transcript page in 
the entire brief in chief and the references to the 
transcript wholly fail to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 15(6), 16(b) and (16(e), supra. Accordingly, we 
will not review the record or consider the claimed errors 
relied upon for reversal. At 409. (Citations omitted) 
Also see Methola v. County of Eddy, 629 P.2d 350 (N.M. App., 1981). 
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evidence presented that .shows thai thettj is a question 11 I 11 
whether the defendant negligently misrepresented the plaintiff in 
III " I 11 1 1 l.i 1 1 III I ' III III I III III I ' >|, r i p l • Jl * I I fa I ' I III I , I I t ' | > I U | i t • » 1 * I J, III III II 11 III I ' b I I t I III III I t J I III ' I | " I I I 1 1 1 II III 1 1 * 
( L o o s l e B r i e f , ll'iiqi1 II, Line 1') |i Hi I III i u in 1 In * Trir j l Court-
r e c o r d ? What was t h e " e v i d e n c e p r e i iiil i ill ' Wlni III " e v i d e n c e " ? 
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speculate. 
IJI^ Q
 L o o g r i e f ' S t a t e m e n t of t h e Cat'ii II iiil Il in Illllii Il i >".ni n L 
Fac ts ' says , 'Approximate 1 y t" i glil Y'11'1^111"1, a^IL:ei puichasing the home, 
advice ni -jndant/ respondent sought ten 
•" " ' -— . *-raised for 
approximately twenty-four thousand dollars less than the purchase 
price despite many improvements and a general increase in property 
v a I j i t ' mi in in 1 II in II -i r i l«i | 11 o n R To B i * i t»f , P«i q e " i , III. i 111 ? II |i III" III i 
s t a t e m e n t i s LupltiUj wil.li t a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s luiil Ihiil iii ii I I I In \ 
a r e • - •• a l l e g a t i o n s . I Jt J tac.Lii ut c i t a t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t 
II iiHSt-« a s s e r t mi 11 mi in « II II II • II in mi i in II II mi III i M T i l i t n i , l i t l i i i i S I H In II o f v n l n n r c i n I  III 
Record. Almost every paragraph of the Loosle Brief likewise 
contains unsubstantiated claims of "facts" in evidence at the Trial 
I 11 II nil i II ii II II III i III w i H I M mi HI ill mi mi in II M I i I i " i n i v\ mi o p i i ' H » M i l * ' < ! l i y l , t H i s l e s " | J i | i n 1 I I . 
L o o s l e s c o n t i n u e Lu a iy i < , " i hej e "s a del. i n i L e q u e s t i o n as t o 
whetlit mi I Ii Ii lendanl n e g l i g e n t l y m i s r e p r e s e n t e d t h e f i r s t 
a p p r a i s a l I 111 l hi > i i I  11 > 11II I In I  1111 I i| I .< n i 111 • Hi ii>f IM<|f' 'I I i I  11 
1
 «1 ) I1' ii'st Federal represented nothing to Loosles, They pi epared 
an "in house" uppiaisal in the ordinary course of business. 
Affidavit of Paul Petersen. R. pp. 94-96. In Dirks v. Cornwell, 
754 P.2d 946 (Utah App., 1988), the Utah Appellate Court stated: 
We note initially that defendants' brief on appeal fails 
to conform to Rule 24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals because there are no citations to the record. 
Rule 24(a) requires that each party make a concise 
statement of the facts and cite to the pages in the 
record where those facts are supported. We have 
previously ruled that if a party fails to adhere to this 
rule, "the court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below. 'This Court need not, and will not, 
consider any facts not properly cited to, or fsicl 
supported by, the record.' " (quoting Koulis and 
Uckerman cases hereafter cited) . . . We could, 
therefore, sua sponte disregard defendants' brief on 
appeal and assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
However, we also affirm the trial court's judgment on the 
merits. At 947-948. 
Since the case involved no issues of fact, the Court dealt 
with the merits. But it appears since Loosles are asking for 
consideration of facts in their appeal, the holding of Dirks 
regarding a deficient brief means the Trial Court decision should 
be affirmed. In Koulis v. Standard Oil Company of California, 746 
P.2d 1182 (Utah App., 1987), the Appellate Court held that, "If a 
party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and citation 
of the pages in the record where those facts are supported, the 
court will assume the correctness of the judgment below." 
(Citations omitted) At 1184. The Loosle Brief is identical in 
rule non-compliance with the briefs submitted in the Dirks and 
Koulis cases, which mandates the affirmance of the Trial Court. 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah, 1987); Trees v. 
Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612-12 (Utah, 1987). See also White River 
Shale Oil Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 700 P.2d 1088, 1089 
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n I ( l l l . ih , I ' lHS); SLdLe v. T u c k e r , hS/ I1 'il /SS, / S h - S / j l l h i h , 
i ** 
-The Advi sorry Committee Note to Utah Ri :i ] es of Appi,,l late 
Procedure on Rule 24 also requires each party subniitting a bi lef to 
set forth a properly documented a r g ument: '"'The argument shal I 
presented an I I:l le rea soi is therefore, i; ; I I:l i,„ • citations I I III 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on, " 
JliI lU&a I * ' 'I | I I ' ! 1'IT I III III III II II III I I 11 II I I I " J 1 I I I J I II 
Loosles argue about property values, (It'eels, easements, a well, 
appraisals rulinary writei, misrepresentations! trust fcds, 
Ji I I l p l ( I U O I l l i e i l t " i l i i l i l l l II l | l | l | l l | M II II II l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l I I II ( l | H « i I 1,1 i l l l l l l l lul I III I I I III 
r e f e r e n c e t o an E x h i b i t , an A f f i d a v i t , ii D e p o s i t i o n , ni t h e Record . 
I n S t a t e i n I n t e r e s t of M.S. v . SaJ:atci IMIih llJ 'ill l11 b (Utah App , 
,11 991 | , t h e Cour t uf Appeals wrntt" "tta I «i IILIJ • l a i l u i i I 11 spec. i l> i in 
h i s b r i e f an i n s t a n c e of a l l e g e d e r r o r by I he I in i«A I i n u r t arid h i s 
f a l l u in ILo ri"»ii i I i r e l e v a n t a u t h o r i t y 1 P i i lllliii i in IIHIIIMIIL 
u n s u p p o r t e d , iiiid we d e c l x n e t o c o n s i d e r i t I I .' Il III 
F i r s t F e d e r a l has p r e p a r e d i t s B r i e f Willi ' i t a t i o n s lu III -
Record . If L o o s l e s a r e now " f l u s h e d oiiiiil iiiiii lliiexr Rep ly Br i e f and 
( » p r e v i o u s l y 'unknown p l a c e s in t h e r e c o r d troiii which 
- * irgumen rim I Lai; I, ,s" are baii-iecl, t h e a p p e l l a t e p r o c e s s becomes 
<a cat and mo e" qanie t h a t i s n e i t h e r e f f i c i e n t nor fain , Il r i II III 3 
c a s e _. . _ . he p l e a d i n g s on t h e i r f ace show m g e n u i n e i s s u e of 
m a t e r i a Il In i m p o s i t i o n of t h e Pla i n t i f f s sh iw r n n t e s t u i l 
i ' • r "* II 'i ' I ii'ii II I R i " i e f I in , II I Il  mi IIIIII I I I1'III in mi " I l l | -Hraqrcsphf- f 
the pleadings; which factual issues; where in the 230-plus pages of 
Loosles' depositions? Loosles disclose nothing in their brief but 
such conclusory statements that make response very difficult 
without citation to specifics and to the Record. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Uckerman v. Uckerman, 588 
P.2d 142 (Utah, 1978), "This Court need not, and will not, consider 
any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." At 
144. This Court should not condone non-compliance with critical, 
fundamental rules of appellate procedure. Loosles' failures go to 
the very essence of the appellate process of framing issues. The 
Court should affirm the ruling of the Trial Court or the appeal 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
FIRST FEDERAL BECAUSE LOOSLES COULD NOT RELY ON FIRST 
FEDERAL'S 1980 "IN HOUSE" APPRAISAL, WHEN LOOSLES FIRST 
LEARNED OF THE APPRAISAL IN 1988. WHICH APPRAISAL LOOSLES 
CLAIM CONSTITUTED THE MISREPRESENTATION, 
The Loosles' claim of misrepresentation is totally lacking in 
the legal and factual allegations required to establish a cause of 
action. Loosles provide not one shred of evidence that First 
Federal misrepresented anything to Loosles and that Loosles relied 
upon the same. Loosles state in their Brief, "Appellants (Loosles) 
brought this action because they felt they were misrepresented by 
the defendant/respondent's (First Federal) first appraisal in 
1980." Loosle Brief, p. 6, lines 1-3. 
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A, THE APPRAISAL PERFORMED BY FIRST FEDERAL WAS FOR 
INTERNAL AUDITING PURPOSES ONLY IN MAKING THE LOAN TO THE 
LOOSLES; LOOSLES DID NOT KNOW FIRST FEDERAL HAD AN 
APPRAISAL IN ITS FILE UNTIL 1988 AND THEREFORE
 f THE 
LOOSLES DID NOT RELY UPON ANY REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN 
FIRST FEDERAL'S APPRAISAL. 
Loosies allege in their original and Verified Complaint da I i il 
Jiii 11 in mi I  Ml I " I HI 11 1 I  in in il I  i r il I 'Vml t ' i ii I  | i i "i" I o t linen I mi ii(,)[ u d i II-II in I  i i p p i iii i ,i in n i g 
t h e H a r p e r W a i d p r o p e r t y al l f i l P r O M M . M M i n S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 8 0 . L o o s i e s 
a J l e g e t h a t I In , " r e l i e d " imi1111 IIi F i r s t I  i illi o'dii II1 s a p p r a i s a l i m 
a t i. e p I i i in 11 I I  in i i I  I  in in Il I I  in i' in I in I  111 o |>111 ' I I» '! e o 11111 a * j i'«i [)hi i- II 1111 I  I 3 
of Loosies" Verified i.'ompl ri i nl II" |i|i J / Sine*" llii" e 
paragraphs are deleted in the Loosies' Amended Verified Compiaimt, 
l . t K J b k - ' s Ui- ji i I  ii'illl A illi <!i<l i nil i tiiiiip I (i i i l l i m i l i n II i m i i p e t M in ct I l o y d i l l II n 
o l mi mi in mi I  representation o r f r a u d n g a i n s t F i . r s l I  t " d e i M I , b u l l niiiill], 
a c | in mi mi i 1 I  I in i I  in i I  I > i r , 11' I I if i 16 6-1"""' 4 T h e on il y r n 11 I r a b 1 e 
it I l e g a l Lcjii in II I  In n mi mi mi I .wit Ini I V i t T i l j e d Lump I d i n l I.I I Ii ml I' i i h t - F e d e i a l 
" o b t a i n e d a n a p p r a i s a l u t t h e M M I p r o p e r t y ami t h e f a i r m a r k e t 
v a l u e of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y was i n 1 lm siiiiii nil i I P , Ml III 1)1) I hi it i t 
w o u l d bo a g o o d iimon iiilliiiiii iiill i" iiiiiii iiiulod C o m p l a i n t , p a r a g r a p h I ,' III. 
p p I 11 Hi I  "'I . 
T h e e l e m e n t s o f nn -i i" i o b n ^ e d f r a u d u l e n t 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a r e a s I"o 1 I o », 
(1) A, representation; 
(2) Concerning a presently exis ting materia ] fact; 
(3) which was false; 
( I) wh I ch the representor either (a) ki lew to be 
•'• false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base si ich 
representationsj 
(5) f o r t h e p u r p o s e nl indue iity Lho ul he r pa r try t o 
a c t upon i t ; 
(6) t:l lat the other party, acting reasonably and :i n 
i gno ranee of i t s f a1s ity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Duaan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah, 1980). 
In order for there to be a finding of fraud/misrepresentation 
by First Federal, Loosles must demonstrate the existence of ai 
nine (9) elements. Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Ut.ih, 
1980); Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah, 1984). Loosles 
assert in their Complaint and Amended Complaint that First Fpderal 
made a representation as to the value of the property to them 
through the appraisal. 
Theresa Loosle relates what First Federal (Paul Petersc i) told 
her: 
A. Well, he told us that, you know, this was the 
selling price for the home. And he went through the 
whole thing with us. This was the selling price, this 
was what First Federal was willing to assume, you know, 
and go along with us. 
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 7, lines 13-17. 
Loosles made a decision to exchange their home in Perry and 
contacted Jeff and Kevin Packer of All-Pro Realty concerning the 
exchange. Jeff and Kevin Packer showed Loosles the Property 
several times prior to the Loosles deciding to purchase the Harper 
Ward Property. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 14, lines 10-23. The listing 
price for the Harper Ward Property was $89,900.00. M.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 16, line 15. Mr. and Mrs. Loosle discussed the value of 
the Harper Ward Property with Kevin Packer and Jeff Packer and 
Packers informed them $89,900.00 was the sale price of the home and 
that is what it was worth. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 16, lines 18-20 and 
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Packer and Jeff. Packer regarding the value of the Property Mrs. 
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1983, Dep. Exhibit Nos. h and 
Clearly, at no time prior to the Earnest Money Agreement being 
executed had First Federal or its agents made any representations 
to Loosles. They had no contact with them! Mr. Loosle has no 
recollection of meeting or talking to Mr. Petersen until after 
signing the Earnest Money. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 29, lines 4-10, 
Dep. Exhibit No. 1. Jeff and Kevin Packer made the only 
representations concerning the value of the Harper Ward Property. 
In fact, Plaintiff Marlin K. Loosle acknowledges in his deposition: 
Q. You knew when you went into First Federal 
Savings in 1980 to sign the loan documents that you 
already had signed a binding, legal contract? 
A. Yes, uh-huh. 
M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 61, line 5. 
Thus, a binding, valid contract had been entered into by the 
Loosles to exchange the homes and property prior to any 
conversations or meetings with First Federal or any of its agents. 
When Loosles agreed to exchange the homes and signed the 
Earnest Money And Offer To Purchase on September 10, 1980 no 
appraisal had been shown to them. They did not request one. The 
Earnest Money was not contingent on any appraisal. T.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 14, lines 16-18. The Loosles had merely relied upon the 
representations made by Jeff and Kevin Packer and their own opinion 
". . .We felt it was a good price". T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 17, line 
12. Therefore, the essential element of a representation being 
communicated to the Loosles cannot be met as a matter of fact or as 
a matter of law. Loosles' Brief does not argue otherwise. Because 
Loosles cannot show a representation by First Federal concerning 
the value of the Harper Ward Property prior to them signing their 
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done any type of an appraisal in connect ion with t he I  IIII 
at the time you purchased the home? 
A 1 < :> 
M.L. Dc sp. , ] 989 , j: > 38
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Q . So y o u r f i r s t knowledge t h a t F i r s t F e d e r a . 
e v e n done an a p p r a i s a l would have been i n 1988 ; i s 
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1980 , a p p r o x i m a t e l y e i g h t (8) y e a r s a f t e r t.he p u r c h a s e of t h e home. 
The only conceivable claim in the entire Record on the Summary 
Judgment is that First Federal made a loan and somehow by doing 
this they warranted the value of the Property to Loosles. 
Q. Do you know if Paul Petersen had ever been on 
the property in Harper Ward in 1980 when you closed your 
loan, prior to that time? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Did you make any inquiry of him? 
A. No. 
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 18, lines 11-16. (See also h.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 77, lines 1-5.) 
Q. Do you have any basis for believing that Paul 
Petersen knew that the home was worth or valued at some 
figure other than $89,900.00 at the time you closed your 
loan? 
A. No. I just assumed that he knew that, being he 
was making the loan. 
T,L. Dep., 1989, p. 18, lines 22-25; p. 19, lines 1-2. 
Q. Can you tell me as best you recall exactly what 
what [sic] was said in your meeting at First Federal 
Savings with Paul Petersen? 
A. What was said? 
Q. Yes. And what was done? 
A. Well, basically he said— It was like Marlin 
said. It was a lot of chit-chat, you know, about buying 
the home and he mentioned how, you know, that it sounded 
like a great area or whatever. You know. Home or 
whatever you want to say. Farm. I think most people, or 
men maybe I should say, like a lot of area. And so I 
think we talked about that a little bit. You know. And 
then he proceeded to present us with the papers, and 
That's about it. 
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 23, lines 8-25. 
Q. Did you have any knowledge that there had been 
any appraisal of the property, or would be any appraisal 
of the property done at the time you closed the loan? 
A. No. 
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 24, lines 7-10. 
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that we were—that I was interested in the acreage 
the general area and this type of thing, and we kind ot 
discussed that. And he said he was happy for us, 
know, and this type of thing. Just general chit-cha^ 
think 
Q, Would JL be a laii statement that the primary 
representations that were made to you of value of the 
. home in Harper Ward were made by your realtor? 
A. Kevin? 
Q. Yes, 
A. Yen, Absolutely, 
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tation, or reasonable reliance against First Federal. 
Loosles provided nothing to the Trial Court to show First 
Federal knew or should have known its 1980 appraisal was incorrect. 
A 1988 appraisal shows nothing concerning the validity or accuracy 
of a 1980 appraisal. Loosles provided nothing to show the 1980 
values placed on the Perry property being exchanged were incorrect. 
What if both properties were equally over-priced? Loosles never 
allege First Federal misrepresented any value of the Perry 
property. First Federal provided an Affidavit of Paul Petersen 
stating the appraisal was for "in house" use and was "not performed 
for or at the request of the Loosles". R. pp. 94-96. That remains 
uncontradicted. Lenders are not insurers to every borrower of the 
value of property. The Findings of Fact attached as Exhibit "A" to 
this Brief have inserted in each paragraph the specific support 
from the Record. 
Loosles' Brief claims, "There is a definite question as to 
whether the Defendant (First Federal) negligently misrepresented 
the first appraisal for the value of the land." Loosles' Brief, p. 
9, line 24. How could Loosles rely on this? Loosles signed the 
Earnest Money before they ever saw First Federal; they knew nothing 
of the "in house" appraisal; they relied on the realtor for the 
values of both properties. 
Element Evidence 
(1) Representation None - never knew of appraisal. 
(2) Material Fact None - no evidence Property worth 
less than $89,900.00 exchange price. 
(3) False None - Paul Petersen affidavit 
uncontradicted. 
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(4) Knew False -
Recklessly 
(5) Inducing 




(8) Induced to Act 
(9) To Injury 
and Damage 
None. 
None - Earnest Money signed before 
Loosles saw First Federal and only 
purpose for seeing First Federal -
to obtain a loan. 
None - relied on realtor for value 




Even accepting the Loosles' statements as correct, there is no 
cause of action. 
B. EVEN IF FIRST FEDERAL HAD MADE FRAUDULENT 
MISREPRESENTATIONS TO LOOSLES, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MUST STAND BECAUSE LOOSLES' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Generally, a statute of limitation runs against any cause of 
action when the cause of action comes into being. Leach v. 
Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah, 1975). A cause of action 
arises the moment an action may be maintained to enforce it, and 
the statute of limitations is then set in motion. O'Hair v. 
Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (Utah, 1970); Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 
1374, 1379 (Utah, 1977). 
A complaining party does not have to have actual notice of the 
alleged fraud. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 
1185 (Utah App. 1987). The Utah Court of Appeals stated in Koulis: 
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However, if one is fully informed of such facts and 
information as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence upon inquiry, and one makes no inquiry, then he or 
she is deemed to have discovered all that would have been 
revealed, and the running of the statute of limitations 
commences. At 1185. 
See also Gibson v. Jensen, 158 P. 426, 427 (Utah, 1916). 
The Utah Supreme Court said that one who claims to be 
defrauded must exercise reasonable prudence and diligence in 
discovering the fraud and seeking a remedy for it or that party 
will be precluded from doing so. Bezner v. Continental Dry 
Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah, 1976). 
Regarding the duty of an individual to investigate a 
representation the Supreme Court stated: 
The one who complains of being injured by such a false 
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is 
told him, but has a duty of exercising such degree of care to 
protect his own interest as would be exercised by an ordinary, 
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances; and if 
he fails to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to 
account for the consequences of his own neglect. Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corporation. 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah, 1967). 
When parties enter into an arms-length transaction and certain 
representations are made then the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
where the underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of 
the parties, the complaining party is obligated to take reasonable 
steps to inform himself and protect his interests. Suqarhouse 
Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah, 1980). 
Loosles apparently took those steps with their realtors and felt 
comfortable. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 16, lines 16-24. 
Loosles exchanged the property at the listing price. They 
made no effort to negotiate the values placed by the realtor on 
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either home and they did not check with any other real estate 
agents, friends or neighbors. "And so we just took his (Kevin 
Packer's) recommendation and his word from that point on." M.L. 
Dep., 1989, p. 60, lines 1-6. 
From 1980 through 1988 Loosles received tax notices every year 
from the Box Elder County Assessor's Office. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 
36, lines 17-19. It is clear from the tax notices that the Box 
Elder County Assessor's Office valued the property in 1986 through 
1988 at $59,167.00. First Federal's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibits D-
1, D-2 and D-3; R. pp. 97-119. Furthermore, Marlin Loosle 
testified that the tax notices did have some indication as to 
valuation on them when he received them. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 36, 
line 22. However, he did not make any inquiry of anyone regarding 
the tax notices and the values that were established. He simply 
complained every year that the taxes seemed to be going up. M.L. 
Dep., 1989, p. 36, line 25; p. 37, line 1. 
From 1980 through 1988 Loosles were clearly put on notice that 
the value of the property may have been lower than the exchange 
price. For example, in an exchange it is possible to exchange 
$1,000.00 per bushel apples for $1,000.00 per bushel oranges. 
Loosles provided the Trial Court nothing concerning the accurate or 
inaccurate value placed on the Perry property which was exchanged 
for the Harper Ward Property. 
Since the Loosles are claiming misrepresentation, they must 
exercise reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering the 
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misrepresentation, Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation. 423 P.2d 659 
(Utah, 1967). Loosles did not exercise any prudence or diligence 
in discovering or in seeking a remedy for the purported wrong. 
Their Complaint for fraud/misrepresentation was not filed until 
April 24, 1989, over eight and one-half (8-1/2) years after they 
acquired the Property by exchange. The statute of limitations for 
fraud is as follows: 
Within three years: 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action in such case 
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fratid or mistake. 
Utah Code Ann., §78-12-26 (1953 as amended). 
If Loosles made a bad business decision in 1980, they cannot 
shift that burden to First Federal. 
Q. Did you ever ask him (Paul Petersen), "Is the 
property worth $89,900.00"? 
A. No, I don't recall specifically asking that. 
Q. Did you ever ask that of the Packers? 
A. I'm not sure. It seemed like we said to Kevin, "Does 
that sound reasonable to you? Is that what we should—" 
Because, you know, I wanted the acreage. And as I recall 
talking to Kevin, you know, "Does that sound good to you? 
Does that sound like that would be a good thing for us?" And 
he indicated yes. And so we just took his recommendation and 
his word from that point on. 
Q. Were you somewhat anxious for the property? Was it 
something you'd always wanted and never quite had? 
A. In retrospect, I think I probably was more anxious 
than was advisable. . . 
M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 59, lines 21-25; p. 60, lines 1-10. 
Even if one assumes all nine (9) elements of misrepresentation are 
met by Loosles, the statute of limitations has long expired and the 
right to any claim is extinguished. 
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The Trial Court correctly found no representation, no reliance 
and no cause of action for Loosles. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY QUIETED TITLE TO CERTAIN WATER 
RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF FIRST FEDERAL AND THERE IS ADEQUATE 
EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FACTUAL 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SPRING AND WELL 
WATERS WERE APPURTENANT TO THE REAL PROPERTY AND WERE 
PLEDGED TO FIRST FEDERAL, 
The basic issues at trial were as follows: 
1. Are the spring waters to the Loosle Spring and Thorpt ;11 
appurtenant to the Property? 
2. If the rights to use of water from the Loosle Sprin^ and 
Thorpe Well are appurtenant to the Property, were they pledged to 
First Federal by virtue of the Trust Deed executed between Loosles 
and First Federal? 
The Trial Court, after hearing all the testimony, held that 
the waters were appurtenant and were pledged to First Federal 
both of these issues basically revolve around the intent of Lhe 
parties. The Loosles' Brief does not cite one (1) Finding of Fact 
or Conclusion of Law entered by the Trial Court which is not 
supported in the record. Loosles made no demand for jury tria* in 
this matter, and even if they did, they waived the right to the 
same by making no objection at the time of trial. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
part: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially ... Findings of fact, whether 
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based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous ..." 
In its decision on the standard of appellate review, Scharf v. 
BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
determined the Loosle's burden in order to overcome a trial court's 
findings of fact: 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's 
findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. 
In Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988), the Supreme 
Court provided the nexus between Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Scharf (supra) in the following language: 
First, review of findings of fact is controlled by rule 
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. To mount a 
successful challenge to trial court findings under this 
rule, an appellant must marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings. At 922. 
In State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App., 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that "If the appellant fails to so marshal 
the evidence, the appellate court need not consider the challenge 
to its sufficiency." At 738-739. 
Loosles have failed to meet or to even undertake the 
marshalling requirement. In fact, all Loosles have done, at best, 
is to argue the Trial Court's conclusions and have not even 
suggested there is an inadequate basis in the record. This does 
not begin to meet the marshalling burden Loosles must carry. Under 
State v. Moore, supra, this Court need not consider the challenge 
of Loosles to the Trial Court's decision. 
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The counter point to Loosles' failure to marshall the evidence 
supporting the Trial Court's findings and demonstrate the evidence 
failed to support the Trial Court's findings is that the Trial 
Court's findings and decision were based on substantial, credible 
evidence, and this Court should not invade the Trial Court's 
province to assess and weigh that evidence unless the Trial Court 
abused its discretion. The Findings of Fact attached as Exhibit 
"D" to this Brief have inserted in each paragraph the specific 
support from the Transcript of the Trial for the finding of the 
same. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Loosles had marshalled the evidence 
in favor of the verdict, that evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Court's Judgment, is competent and supports the 
Court's Judgment. In Western Fiberglass. Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie 
and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 (Ut. App., 1990), the Court held: 
Resolution of a factual dispute is a matter for the jury 
as trier of the fact, unless evidence on the issues "so 
clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that 
reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of the 
case." 
The Deed of Trust signed by Loosles, which was subject to the 
foreclosure, pledged: 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights. 
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and 
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply 
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and 
profits, water, water rights, and water stock, and all 
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all 
of which, including replacements and additions thereto, 
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property 
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing, 
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if 
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this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred 
to as the "Property". Tr. Exhibit No. 6. 
When the Loosles purchased the Property in 1980, the Loosle 
Spring was the sole source of culinary and irrigation water. The 
Loosle Spring is located on the property immediately in front of 
the home. Tr., p. 28, lines 5-16. The Looses subsequently found 
that the Spring caused flooding in the basement and that the Spring 
water was not good for drinking or cooking when there was a heavy 
rain storm or during the summer season when irrigation water was 
running through a cement ditch which passes in front of the 
Property, between the Spring source and the public highway. Tr., 
p. 33, lines 12-17; TrG, p. 34, lines 3-11; Tr., p. 35, lines 11-
17. Consequently, for some period of time after taking possession 
the Loosles hauled water into the home for drinking purposes and 
cooking purposes. Tr., p. 34, lines 16-25. At the time the 
Loosles acquired the Property by exchange and delivered the Trust 
Deed to First Federal, no filings with the State Engineer had been 
made upon the Loosle Spring. Tr., p. 28, lines 2-4. 
Subsequent to this time, the Thorpes, Curtises and Loosles 
agreed to share in the cost of the construction of a well on the 
Curtis' property, a nearby neighbor. This occurred in 1982-83. 
Tr. Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10. While originally designed as a three 
(3) family well, it ultimately became a five (5) family well, with 
the Loosles owning a proportionate interest (from 1/3 to 1/5) in 
the well and the water from it. Mr. Thorpe filed on the well with 
the State Engineer's Office for a three (3) family well. Tr., p. 
39, lines 7-13. Mr. Thorpe subsequently filed for two (2) 
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additional families. Tr., p. 39, lines 14-17. The well was 
completed and hooked up in 1982 or early 1983. Underground piping 
was placed from the well to the Loosle home. Tr., p. 44-45-46. 
The well water was piped so that either the well water or the 
Spring water could be diverted to be used inside the Loosle home. 
Tr., p. 50, lines 3-12. Even though there is simply a valve which 
will change the source of water to the home from the well water to 
the Spring water, since 1982 the Loosles have solely used the well 
water for culinary purposes in the home. Tr., p. 52, lines 7-25. 
The applicable Utah statute appears to be §73-1-11: 
A right to the use of water appurtenant to land shall 
pass to the grantee of such land, and, in cases where 
such right has been exercised in irrigating different 
parcels of land at different times, such right shall pass 
to the grantee of any parcel of land on which such right 
was exercised next preceding the time of the execution of 
any conveyance thereof; . . . provided that any such 
right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may be 
reserved by the grantor in any such conveyance by making 
such reservation in express terms in such conveyance 
. . . Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
An after acquired water right passes to an existing lienholder: 
Generally, every right or interest held by a mortgagor in 
and to the mortgaged property, together with all 
SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRED RIGHTS, easements, and privileges 
which are necessary and essential to the full enjoyment 
of the property, passes with the mortgage . . . 
Mortgages, 55 Am,Jur.2d § 803. 
The question of whether or not the water is appurtenant to the 
land is basically a question of the intent of the parties. 
Easements in gross are not favored, however, and a water 
right or easement will ordinarily be presumed not to be 
in gross where it can fairly construed to be appurtenant 
to some other estate. If a water right is in its nature 
an appropriate and useful adjunct of the land conveyed, 
having in view the intention of the grantee as to its 
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use, and there is nothing to show that the parties 
intended it to be a mere personal right, it should be 
held to be an easement appurtenant to the land, and not 
an easement in gross. 
Waters, 78 Am.Jur.2d 233. 
The Loosles owned the Property at the time the well and Spring 
rights were utilized and filed upon; it is clear that the well and 
Spring were the only sources of water for the land in question 
(Tr., p. 52, lines 7-25); that Loosles were the sole users of the 
Spring (Tr., p. 35, lines 18-24, p. 36, lines 5-17); it is also 
clear and undisputed that the only land owned by the Loosles in the 
area was the Property served by the spring and by the well (Tr., p. 
64, lines 14-23), and that Loosles intended the spring and well 
rights to be utilized on this Property. (Ti:., p. 56, lines 1-6; 
Tr., p. 58, lines 19-22; Tr., p.66, lines 15-19.) Tr. Exhibit 14. 
All of the Loosles' pleadings, affidavits and filings as well as 
the testimony at trial suggest that they considered the well, 
changes to the spring and use of the water rights to be an 
improvement to this Property. Tr., p. 51, lines 14-17. If it was 
an improvement to this property, it was an appurtenance to it. 
Tr., p. 75, lines 6-9. The fact that Loosles have utilized the 
well water since 1982 as the sole source of culinary and domestic 
water for this Property, speaks very strongly of their intent. 
Tr., p. 52, lines 7-25; p. 53, lines 23-25; p. 55, lines 2-5; p. 
74, lines 10-15. Also, the Application to the State Engineer to 
utilize the Spring water solely for irrigation and stockwatering 
further demonstrates that Loosles considered the well water the 
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sole source of culinary water for the Property, because it was the 
only other water source, Tr. Exhibit No. 14. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Bauer v. Prestwich, 578 
P.2d 1283 (1978), "The use of water upon land makes it appurtenant 
to that land; and unless it was separately deeded away, it would 
pass with the land." At 1284. As the Supreme Court of Montana 
stated in Adams v. Chilcott, 597 P.2d 1140 (Montana, 1979), "When 
a thing is used for the benefit of land, it is deemed appurtenant 
to the land ... if the property is transferred without an express 
reservation of the appurtenant water rights, they accompany the 
land." At 1145. 
The State of Washington holds likewise, as in Foster v. 
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 687 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1984) the 
Court wrote, "A water right is considered real property which is 
appurtenant to and passes with the conveyance of the land which 
receives its beneficial use." At 844. Since the rights to use of 
the Spring water and well water are appurtenant to the land, they 
were pledged to First Federal by virtue of the Trust Deed executed 
between the parties. 
The only and sole source of culinary drinking water for this 
property is the well. It is not only necessary but essential to 
the full and reasonable enjoyment of the Property. 
A conveyance of land upon a foreclosure sale must of 
necessity - at least, as between the parties to the 
mortgage - carry with it a water right appurtenant to the 
land, acquired and used by the mortgagor for the benefit 
of the land, although obtained after the execution of the 
mortgage and before the sale on foreclosure. 
Mortgages, 55 Am.Jur.2d § 804. 
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The case of Stephens v. Burton, 546 P.2d 240 (Utah, 1976), 
specifically upheld the concept of § 73-1-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953, 
as amended), "We believe and hold that the water appurtenant to the 
two tracts of land conveyed is the amount of water which was 
beneficially used thereon before and at the time of the sale." At 
241. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Roberts v. Roberts. 584 
P.2d 378 (1978), "In Utah, a deed which conveys land to a grantee 
also conveys the right to use appurtenant water, unless expressly 
reserved. Appurtenant water is the amount of water beneficially 
used on the land before and at the time of the sale." There is no 
dispute that the well water was beneficially used for the domestic 
and culinary uses prior to the Trustee's Sale, and that the spring 
water was used for irrigation purposes by the Loosles. 
There was no reservation of any water rights by the Loosles in 
the Trust Deed conveyance and pledge to First Federal. Tr. Exhibit 
No. 6. Furthermore, the water which was appurtenant to the land 
and used at the time of the conveyance through the Trustee's Sale 
and Trustee's Deed, was the water of the Thorpe Well and Loosle 
Spring. Tr. Exhibit No. 23. There was no express reservation made 
whatsoever in the Trustee's Deed. 
In Salt River Valley Water Users' Association v. Kovacovich, 
411 P.2d 201 (Ariz. App. 1966), the Arizona Court of Appeals 
specifically held . . . "a water right is attached to the land on 
which it is beneficially used and becomes appurtenant thereto, and 
that the right is not in any individual or owner of the land. It 
is in no sense a floating right, nor can the right, once having 
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attached to a particular piece of land, be made to do duty to any 
other land, with certain exceptions. . •" At 203. 
The language of the Deed of Trust is clear and unmistakable, 
inasmuch as the conveyance clearly included, "together with all of 
the improvements now OR HEREAFTER ERECTED ON THE PROPERTY, AND ALL 
. . . WATER, WATER RIGHTS . . . AND ALL FIXTURES NOW OR HEREAFTER 
ATTACHED TO THE PROPERTY ALL OF WHICH, INCLUDING REPLACEMENTS AND 
ADDITIONS THERETO, SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE AND REMAIN A PART OF THE 
PROPERTY COVERED BY THIS DEED OF TRUST . . . " Also, in the 
foreclosure process, the Notice of Default, the Notice of Trustee's 
Sale, and the Trustee's Deed, all contain almost the same language. 
The Trustee's Deed specifically provided: 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral oil and gas 
rights and profits, water, water rights and water stock, 
and all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the 
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed, 
without warranty as to title. Tr. Exhibit No. 23. 
Whatever rights, title and interest which Loosles had in the well 
and in the Spring, were conveyed, transferred and pledged to First 
Federal and when foreclosed upon, passed to First Federal as 
appurtenances, improvements, and water rights used beneficially in 
connection with the Loosle property. 
Loosles have not met their burden of showing that the evidence 
so clearly preponderates in their favor that reasonable people 
would not differ on the outcome of the case. In Cambelt 
International Corporation v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987), the 
Supreme Court states: "We consider the evidence in the light most 
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favorable to the verdict, and will not overturn it on appeal when 
it is supported by substantial and competent evidence." At 1242. 
The Trial Court Judgment is based on appropriate findings and 
the application of such factual findings to the law and should be 
affirmed. 
IX 
FIRST FEDERAL SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
IN RESPONDING TO LOOSLES' APPEAL. 
The Promissory Note and Trust Deed executed by Loosles in 
favor of First Federal clearly provide for attorney's fees. Tr. 
Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6. The quiet title action stemmed from Loosles' 
claim that certain water rights were not pledged to First Federal 
and were not owned by First Federal after the Trustee's Sale. The 
Trial Court found otherwise. Since provided by contract, the 
attorney's fees incurred by First Federal are recoverable in this 
matter. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah, 
1988); Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320 (Utah, 1987). 
Furthermore, Rule 24 (k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure clearly provides that the court may charge attorney fees 
against Loosles because of the noncompliance with the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure in their Brief, as previously described. 
In the event the Judgments of the Trial Court in this case are 
upheld on this appeal, First Federal respectfully requests that 
this Court order the Loosles to pay First Fesderal the attorney's 
fees incurred by First Federal on this and the two (2) prior 
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appeals and to remand the issue as to the amount of such attorney's 
fees to the Trial Court for determination. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the Trial Court's Judgments or should 
dismiss Loosles' Appeal because of Loosles' failure to comply with 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In any event Loosles' attacks 
upon the Trial Court's Judgments are without basis in law or in 
fact. Loosles do not attack any of the Trial Court's Findings on 
the misrepresentation or on the quiet title action. This Court 
should find that Loosles have not met their burden of marshalling 
the evidence and that the Trial Court's decisions are based on 
substantial and creditable evidence and are supported in the Record 
and Transcript. In addition, First Federal should be awarded 
attorney's fees for the appeal and such other relief as the Court 
deems just. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Miles P. Jensen^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) exact copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellees, to Appellant's Attorney, Dale 
M. Dorius, at 29 South Main, P.O. Box U, Brigham City, Utah, 84302, 
this 18th day of February, 1992. 






EXHIBIT "A w 
Findings of Fact signed May 17, 1990 based on Trial Court's 
Memorandum Decision dated April 4, 1990. References to evidence 
supporting each Finding in bold. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Box Elder County, State of 
Utah, and were owners of a certain home and real property located 
in Box Elder County, State of Utah and more particularly described 
as follows: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
(hereafter real property) 
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral oil and gas 
rights and profits, water, water rights and water stock, 
and all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the 
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed, 
without warranty as to title. 
2. The Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association of 
Logan, is a Utah corporation with its place of business in Brigham 
City, Box Elder County, Utah. 
3. The Defendant, Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, 
Trustee, is a Utah corporation. 
4. On or about September 11, 1980 the Plaintiffs entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase, with All Pro Real 
Estate Incorporated, a Utah corporation, and Quality Builders 
Incorporated, a Utah corporation, to acquire the real property 
described in Finding No. 1. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 28, lines 10-23. 
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5. On or about the 16th day of September, 1980, Plaintiffs 
executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in favor of Defendant, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, with Hillam 
Abstracting and Insurance Agency as Trustee, and said Trust Deed 
was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County Recorder, State 
of Utah on the 17th day of September, 1980, as Entry No. 80733H in 
Book 336 at Page 382; and said Trust Deed Note was secured by the 
aforementioned Trust Deed. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 53, lines 9-25. 
6. Plaintiffs entered into the Earnest Money Agreement and 
Option to Purchase, and agreed on the purchase price and financial 
arrangements to purchase the home and real property described in 
Findings of Fact No. 1 prior to any involvement or contact with 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan. M.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 29, lines 2-7; p. 47, line 25; p. 48, lines 1-7. 
Plaintiffs did 
not rely on Defendants' representations as to the value of said 
home and real property described in Finding No. 1. M.L. Dep., 
1989, p. 59, lines 21-25; p. 60, lines 1-10; T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 
10, lines 6-11; p. 23, line 5; p. 9, lines 15-17. 
7. An appraisal done by Defendant, First Federal Savings 
Association of Logan, on said real property was done by agents of 
First Federal for its internal purposes as a matter of documenting 
the legitimacy of the loan for their auditors and had no bearing in 
the obtaining of the initial transaction which gives rise to this 
litigation and Defendants never relied on said appraisal in 
purchasing said real property. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 43, lines 10-
13; p. 56, lines 3-7, T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 15, lines 19-22; p. 24, 
lines 7-10; Paul Petersen Affidavit, paragraphs 5-7, R. pp. 94-96. 
8. No fiduciary relationship become established between the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association 
of Logan, except as to the handling of money and not in any respect 
as to the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint. T.L. Dep., 1989, 
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Plaintiffs having made their Motion For Summary Judgment and 
the Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association Of Loan 
and Hillam Abstracting And Insurance Agency, having replied to the 
same, and the Court having reviewed the file and being fully 
advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision 
dated April 4, 1990, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Box Elder County, State of 
Utah, and were owners of a certain home and real property located 
in Box Elder County, State of Utah and more particularly described 
as follows: 
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Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30M West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30M West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30M East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
(hereafter real property) 
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral oil and gas 
rights and profits, water, water rights and water stock, 
and all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the 
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed, 
without warranty as to title. 
)N dc H O G G A N 
)PNEYS AT LAW 
WEST CENTER 
O BOX 5 2 5 
VN UTAH 8 4 3 2 1 
31)752 1551 
ONTON OFFICE 
23 EAST MAIN 
O BOX 1 1 5 
<lTON UTAH 8 4 3 3 7 
D1)257 3885 
2. The Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association 
of Logan, is a Utah corporation with its place of business in 
Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah. 
3. The Defendant, Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, 
Trustee, is a Utah corporation. 
4. On or about September 11, 1980 the Plaintiffs entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase, with All Pro Real 
Estate Incorporated, a Utah corporation, and Quality Builders 
Incorporated, a Utah corporation, to acquire the real property 
described in Finding No. 1. 
5. On or about the 16th day of September, 1980, Plaintiffs 
executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in favor of Defendant, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, with Hillam 
Abstracting and Insurance Agency as Trustee, and said Trust Deed 
was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County Recorder, State 
of Utah on the 17th day of September, 1980, as Entry No. 80733H in 
Book 336 at Page 382; and said Trust Deed Note was secured by the 
aforementioned Trust Deed. 
6. Plaintiffs entered into the Earnest Money Agreement and 
Option to Purchase, and agreed on the purchase price and financial 
arrangements to purchase the home and real property described in 
I & HOGGAN 
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Findings of Fact No. 1 prior to any involvement or contact with 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan. Plaintiffs did 
not rely on Defendants' representations as to the value of said 
home and real property described in Finding No. 1. 
7. An appraisal done by Defendant, First Federal Savings 
Association of Logan, on said real property was done by agents of 
First Federal for its internal purposes as a matter of documenting 
the legitimacy of the loan for their auditors and had no bearing 
in the obtaining of the initial transaction which gives rise to 
this litigation and Defendants never relied on said appraisal in 
purchasing said real property. 
8. No fiduciary relationship become established between the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association 
Of Logan, except as to the handling of money and not in any respect 
as to the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
From the foregoing Findings Of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The foregoing appear to be uncontroverted facts as to the 
elements which would be required to sustain an action based on 
fraudulent representation as set forth in the case of Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), and consequently the Plaintiffs 
as a matter of law cannot sustain or establish the requisite 
elements for their cause of action and, accordingly, Defendants' 
Motion For Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' Complaint 
and Amended Complaint and causes of action as against Defendants, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan and Hillam 
Abstracting and Insurance Agency, as Trustee, are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be controverted that 
there was no reasonable reliance by the Plaintiffs upon any actions 
of Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan 
or its agents or upon Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency as 
Trustee. 
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3. The depositions of Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa 
L. Loosle are on file with the Court and, pursuant to the request 
of Defendants, are accordingly published for purposes of 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 
DATED this / 7 day of May, 1990. 
t. L. Gunnel1,District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, to Plaintiffs' Attorney, 
Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84 302, and to 
Quinn D. Hunsaker, Attorney for Defendants, All Pro Real Estate 
Incorporated, Quality Builders Incorporated and William L. Packer, 
at 102 South 100 West, Brigham City, Utah 84 302, postage prepaid 
in Logan, Utah, this 14th day of May, 1990. 
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Plaintiffs having made its Motion For Summary Judgment, and 
the Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association Of Logan 
and Hillam Abstracting And Insurance Agency, having replied to the 
same, and the Court having reviewed the file and being fully 
advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision 
dated April 4, 1990 and the Court having previously entered its 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law; 
It is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs as a matter of law cannot sustain or 
establish the requisite elements for its cause of action, which 
would be required to sustain an action based on fraudulent 
representation as set forth in the case of Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 
2 
1239 (Utah 1980), and, accordingly, Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' Complaint, Amended Complaint 
and causes of action as against Defendants, First Federal Savings 
& Loan Association of Logan and Hillara Abstracting and Insurance 
Agency, as Trustee, be and are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The depositions of Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa 
L. Loosle are on file with the Court and, pursuant to the request 
of Defendants, are accordingly published for purposes of 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 
DATED this / ^  day of May, 1990. 
F. L. Gunnell, District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Order, to Plaintiffs' Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P. 
0. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and to Quinn D. Hunsaker, 
Attorney for Defendants, All Pro Real Estate Incorporated, Quality 
Builders Incorporated and William L. Packer, at 102 South 100 West, 
Brigham City, Utah 84302, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 
14th day of May, 1990. 




EXHIBIT " D w 
Findings of Fact signed August 1, 1990 from June 15, 1990 
trial. References to evidence supporting each Finding in bold. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle 
(hereafter "Loosles") are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court. 
2. Loosles acquired the following described real property 
(hereafter the "Property") on September 16, 1980: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
Tr. p. 16, lines 1-7 - Exhibit No. 4. 
3. In connection with their purchase of the Property, on or 
about September 16, 1980, the Loosles, for valuable consideration, 
made, executed, and delivered to First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Logan (hereafter "FirstFed") that certain Trust Deed 
Note dated September 16, 1980 in the principal amount of 
$67,000.00. By and through the Note, Loosles agreed to pay to 
FirstFed, or its order, the sum of $67,000.00, together with 
interest on the unpaid principal balance thereof at the rate of 
twelve and three/fourths percent (12.75%) per annum from and after 
the date of the Note. Tr. p. 16, lines 12-13 - Exhibit No. 5. 
4. To secure the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the 
Note, Loosles made, executed and delivered to FirstFed that certain 
Trust Deed dated September 16, 1980 (hereafter "Trust Deed"). The 
Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County, 
Utah, Recorder on September 17, 1980 as Entry No. 80733H in Book 
336 at Page 382 and pledged the Property. Tr. p. 17, line 1 -
Exhibit No. 6. 
5. The Trust Deed provided as part of the Property pledged: 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights. 
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and 
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply 
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and 
profits, water. water rights, and water stock, and all 
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all 
of which, including replacements and additions thereto, 
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property 
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing, 
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if 
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred 
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.) 
Exhibit No. 6. 
6. The Property consists of 3.12 acres of real property with 
a home and outbuildings and is located adjacent to and west of 
State Highway 69, about 5 miles North of Brigham City, Utah, in the 
"Harper Ward" area of Box Elder County, Utah. Exhibit Nos. 1,2, 
3 and 4. 
1. The Property has three (3) springs on it - two (2) of 
which are north of the home and supply a pond. The springs north 
of the home tend to be alkaline and salty and have not been used 
for culinary purposes. Tr. p. 29, lines 5-11, 23-24; p. 30, lines 
2-5. 
8. The third spring (hereafter "Loosle Spring") on the 
Property is located in front/east of the home. Loosles filed an 
Application To Appropriate Water from the Loosle Spring with the 
State Engineer on May 18, 1988, which Application has not been 
acted upon by the State Engineer. Tr. p. 20, line 14 - Exhibit 14. 
9. The Loosle Spring was the only source of culinary water 
for the home in 1980 when Loosles acquired the Property and was 
also used for irrigation purposes on the Property. Tr. p. 28, 
lines 5-16. 
10. The Loosle Spring was piped under the home to the 
rear/west side of the home into a pump house and collecting tank 
where it could be pumped into the home. The pump required 
electricity to function. The Loosle Spring water could also flow 
onto the Property and was used for irrigation purposes by Loosles 
from 1980 through August, 1989 when Loosles vacated the Property. 
Tr. p. 30, lines 5-20; p. 32, lines 2-10; p. 33, lines 2. 
11. Within a few days after Loosles moved onto the Property 
in 1980 they found the Loosle Spring water unacceptable for 
purposes of drinking. Tr. p. 33, lines 12-17; p. 35, lines 11-17. 
Loosles commenced hauling water into the 
home for drinking and for some cooking. They would obtain and haul 
water from nearby neighbors in containers every two (2) or three 
(3) days or sometimes once a week, depending on the season and 
amount of water used. Tr. p. 34, lines 16-25. 
The Loosle Spring continued to supply water 
for household purposes other than drinking. Tr. p. 35, lines 1-10. 
12. The Loosle Spring became contaminated and tasted 
"brackish" whenever there was a heavy rain and became contaminated 
and tasted "brackish" during each irrigation season (April through 
October) when water from a nearby ditch seemed to contaminate the 
spring and increase its flow. Tr. p. 34, lines 3-11. 
13. In 1982 Loosles, along with Thomas Calvin Thorpe, Vonda 
J. Thorpe (hereafter collectively Thorpe), Von R. Curtis and 
Barbara F. Curtis (hereafter collectively Curtis) (all neighbors) 
entered into a verbal agreement to jointly dig a well on property 
owned by the Curtis' to serve each of the three (3) parties' homes 
and the interest of the Loosles in the well was for the benefit of 
the real property owned by Loosles. The well was dug to the South 
and East of the Property and across Highway 69. It consisted of 
the well, a pump, pump house, reservoir and one water line to serve 
the users. The well drilling was successful and thereafter Thomas 
C. Thorpe filed a Water Appropriation No. 57296 (29-2775) claim on 
the well with the office of the State Engineer of the State of 
Utah. The State Engineer approved the well application for the 
use, among others, of three (3) families (domestic plus .25 acres 
irrigation per family) on September 17, 1982. Tr. p. 37, lines 6-
25 - Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10. 
14. Thorpes, Loosles and Curtis' completed piping of the 
water from the well to each of their properties, including the 
Property, in late 1982 or early 1983. Tr. pp. 46-49. 
15. The well and well water right is now the only water right 
available in connection with the Property which is useable year-
round for culinary purposes and which is piped underground to serve 
the same and the plumbing for the home on the Property is designed 
so as to be able to use water from the well. The well water serves 
the Property and home by gravity flow and requires no pumping and 
no electricity to be used. Tr. p. 46-49; p. 54, lines 19-22; p. 56 
lines 1-6; p. 54, lines 19-22. 
16. The pipeline from the well is initially a four inch (4") 
line covered by a protective casing and is 4-5 feet deep as it goes 
West from the well to Highway 69. The line then goes underneath 
Highway 69. On the West side of Highway 69 the pipeline splits 
into one (1) line to serve Thorpe (further to the West) and one (1) 
line to serve the Property (to the North). When it divides to 
serve Thorpe and the Property, the line to the Property is a two 
inch (2M) line 4-5 feet deep covered by sand and other soil 
materials to protect it from damage from rocks. Tr. pp. 46-49. 
17. The well pipeline crosses property originally owned by 
Curtis for which there is a deeded easement in favor of Loosles 
evidenced by that Quit Claim Deed dated July 8, 1986 and recorded 
July 8, 1986 in Book 420 at Page 823 in the Office of the Recorder 
of Box Elder County, Utah. The well pipeline then traverses 
property owned by Thorpe and for which there was agreement that 
Thorpe would give Loosles a written deeded easement, although there 
is no evidence such an easement has been executed and delivered. 
The well pipeline from the well to the Property and home was dug 
with the approval and help of Curtis and Thorpe. Tr. pp. 46-49 -
Exhibit No. 15. 
18. The well pipeline connects to the line to the pumphouse 
and to the home on the Property and has a valve system so the well 
water can be used in the home and/or to irrigate, and 
alternatively, by switching a valve, the Loosle Spring water can be 
used in the home and/or to irrigate. Tr. p. 50, lines 3-12; p. 57, 
lines 9-11. 
19. Since late 1982 or early 1983 Loosles have not hand 
carried water into the home and the well water has been used daily 
since then and has been the exclusive source of domestic/culinary 
water. Tr. p. 52, lines 7-25. 
20. The Loosle Spring, Loosle Spring water rights, spring 
pump and pumphouse, spring collecting tank, well, well pipeline, 
well pipeline easements, as defined in Finding No. 17, well 
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and 
attachments to the foregoing are all permanent improvements to the 
Property (hereafter collectively referred to as Improvements) . Tr. 
p. 53, lines 10-22; p. 61, lines 15-25; p. 66, lines 15-19; p. 69, 
lines 12-17. 
21. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are 
used beneficially in connection with it and are essential and 
critical to have the Property and home useable and marketable 
without a substantial loss in value. Tr. p. 56, lines 11-23; p. 
57, lines 23-25; P. 58, lines 1-5; P. 71, lines 15-23; p. 94, lines 
6-24. 
22. The Loosle Spring water and well water and water rights 
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Water Rights") are 
appurtenant to the Property, are used beneficially in connection 
with it and are essential and critical to have a marketable and 
useable piece of real property and home. Tr. p. 77, lines 13-16. 
Without the Water Rights 
and Improvements the home on the Property has no reasonably useable 
water for culinary purposes and its value would be substantially 
reduced. Tr. p. 60, lines 3-6; p. 61, lines 15-23; p. 74, lines 
10-15; p. 75, lines 5-9; p. 104, lines 6-23. 
23. By reason of Loosles' default in one or more of the 
installments due under the Note, FirstFed caused a Notice of 
Default to be served upon Loosles. The Notice of Default was 
recorded in the Office of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on 
February 2, 1989 in Book 469 at Page 541. The Notice of Default 
was not cured nor was the obligation and Trust Deed reinstated 
within the time allowed by law. Tr. p. 17, lines 10 - Exhibit No. 
7. 
24. A Notice of Trustee's Sale dated June 26, 1989 was 
prepared and by reason of Loosles' failure to cure or reinstate the 
Trust Deed, FirstFed caused a Trustee's Sale to be held on Tuesday, 
July 25, 1989 at the Box Elder County Courthouse. Tr. p. 17, lines 
16-17 - Exhibit No. 8. 
25. FirstFed, being the highest bidder therefore, bought the 
Property secured by the Trust Deed for Sixty-three Thousand Five 
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($63,500.00). Tr. p. 21, line 17 -
Exhibit No. 23; p. 101, lines 5-7. 
26. FirstFed is presently the owner of the following 
described real property which they acquired at the Trustee's Sale 
on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a foreclosure sale against Loosles, 
who were the prior owners of the property: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48 '30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
Tr. p. 21, lines 17 - Exhibit No. 23. 
27. Loosles claim and assert an interest or ownership in the 
Water Rights and Improvements adverse to the claim of FirstFed, and 
such claims of Loosles are without any right whatever, and the 
Loosles have no estate, right, title or interest whatever in said 
Water Rights and Improvements or any part thereof. Tr. p. 62, 
lines 16-22. 
28. Any claims of Loosles to the Water Rights and 
Improvements are void and of no effect because the Water Rights and 
Improvements were pledged by Loosles to FirstFed and then acquired 
by FirstFed as part of the foreclosure (Trustee's Sale) of the 
Property. Exhibit Nos. 6, 7', 8 and 23. 
29. FirstFed and the Property have a great need and necessity 
for the Water Rights and Improvements and any and all rights and 
claims of Loosles to Water Rights and Improvements as described are 
void and of no effect and title should be quieted in the current 
record title owner of the Property, FirstFed. Tr. p. 63, lines 3-
13. 
30. Good Water Rights and successful culinary wells are very 
difficult to find and obtain in the Harper Ward area of Box Elder 
County and there is no city culinary water nearby. Tr. p. 64 -
lines 5-13; p. 105 - lines 2-5. 
31. This decision is binding and is a determination of rights 
as to the Water Rights and Improvements and other items indicated 
as between Loosles and FirstFed and not for any rights as to any 
third parties or other parties not before the Court. 
32. There were no documents available at the time of 
execution of the Trust Deed to further evidence title to the Water 
Rights other than as referenced in the Trust Deed. 
33. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the 
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as: (a) it 
applies to improvements on the property either existing or 
subsequent; (b) it applies and pledges certain kinds of property 
interests which will occur and which need not be directly located 
on the Property, such as easements, rights and appurtenances; (c) 
it includes water and water rights, which often do occur off of the 
property; and (d) it includes fixtures. Exhibit No. 6. 
34. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as 
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the 
testimony of the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the 
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are 
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title 
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and 
after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and 
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and 
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the 
foreclosure sale. Exhibit Nos. 6 and 23. 
35. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever 
severed or used their interest in the Well or water from the Well 
on anything but the Property. Tr. p. 56, lines 1-6. 
36. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever 
severed or used their interest in the Loosle Spring on anything but 
the Property. Tr. p. 36, lines 8-17. 
37. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the 
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for 
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement 
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. Tr. p. 
54, lines 19-25; p. 55, lines 1-25; p. 56, lines 1-6. 
38. The Loosles were interested in having two (2) sources of 
water to serve the Property, and both sources were pledged to 
FirstFed and any and all interest in said Water Rights and 
Improvements now belong to FirstFed and are part of the Property. 
Tr. p. 46-49; p. 53, lines 10-22; p. 54, lines 19-22; p. 56 lines 
1-6, 11-23; p. 57, lines 23-25; P. 58, lines 1-5; p. 61, lines 15-
25; p. 66, lines 15-19; Tr. p. 69, lines 12-17; P. 71, lines 15-23; 
p. 94, lines 6-24. 
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EXHIBIT "E' 
Miles P. Jensen (#1686) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
56 West Center 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and 
THERESA L. LOOSLE, 
Plaintiffs, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, ALL PRO 
REAL ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah. 
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS 
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation, 
and WILLIAM L. PACKER dba QUALITY 
BUILDERS, 
Defendants. Civil No. 890000213CA 
This matter came on for hearing at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on 
Friday, June 15, 1990, in the Court Room in the County Courthouse 
at Brigham, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell 
presiding. The matter in issue was Defendant First Federal Savings 
and Loan Association of Logan's Complaint dated March 8, 1990, 
originally filed as Civil No. 900000129, now consolidated with 
Civil No. 890000213CA. The Plaintiffs were present in person and 
were represented by their counsel, Dale M. Dorius, and Defendant, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, was present and 
represented by its counsel, Olson & Hoggan, Miles P. Jensen, and 
the parties having called certain witnesses, introduced certain 
exhibits, and having made certain arguments to the Court, and the 
Court being fully advised in the matter, and having heard the 
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testimony, reviewed the exhibits and other documents on file, and 
having issued its oral decision from the Bench, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Looale 
(hereafter "Loosles") are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court. 
2. Loosles acquired the following described real property 
(hereafter the "Property") on September 16, 1980: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30* East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30H East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. In connection with their purchase of the Property, on or 
about September 16, 1980, the Loosles, for valuable consideration, 
made, executed, and delivered to First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Logan (hereafter "FirstFed") that certain Trust Deed 
Note dated September 16, 1980 in the principal amount of 
$67,000.00. By and through the Note, Loosles agreed to pay to 
FirstFed, or its order, the sum of $67,000.00, together with 
interest on the unpaid principal balance thereof at the rate of 
twelve and three/fourths percent (12.75%) per annum from and after 
the date of the Note. 
4. To secure the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the 
Note, Loosles made, executed and delivered to FirstFed that certain 
Trust Deed dated September 16, 1980 (hereafter "Trust Deed"). The 
Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County, 
Utah, Recorder on September 17, 1980 as Entry No. 80733H in Book 
336 at Page 382 and pledged the Property. 
5. The Trust Deed provided as part of the Property pledged: 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
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appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and 
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply 
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and 
profits, water, water rightsf and water stock, and all 
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all 
of which, including replacements and additions thereto, 
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property 
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing, 
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if 
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred 
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.) 
6. The Property consists of 3.12 acres of real property with 
a home and outbuildings and is located adjacent to and west of 
State Highway 69, about 5 miles North of Brigham City, Utah, in the 
-Harper Ward" area of Box Elder County, Utah. 
7. The Property has three (3) springs on it - two (2) of 
which are north of the home and supply a pond. The springs north 
of the home tend to be alkaline and salty and have not been used 
for culinary purposes. 
8. The third spring (hereafter "Loosle Spring") on the 
Property is located in front/east of the home. Loosles filed an 
Application To Appropriate Water from the Loosle Spring with the 
State Engineer on May 18, 1988, which Application has not been 
acted upon by the State Engineer. 
9. The Loosle Spring was the only source of culinary water 
for the home in 1980 when Loosles acquired the Property and was 
also used for irrigation purposes on the Property. 
10. The Loosle Spring was piped under the home to the 
rear/west side of the home into a pump house and collecting tank 
where it could be pumped into the home. The pump required 
electricity to function. The Loosle Spring water could also flow 
onto the Property and was used for irrigation purposes by Loosles 
from 1980 through August, 1989 when Loosles vacated the Property. 
11. Within a few days after Loosles moved onto the Property 
in 1980 they found the Loosle Spring water unacceptable for 
purposes of drinking. Loosles commenced hauling water into the 
home for drinking and for some cooking. They would obtain and haul 
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water from nearby neighbors in containers every two (2) or three 
(3) days or sometimes once a week, depending on the season and 
amount of water used. The Loosle Spring continued to supply water 
for household purposes other than drinking. 
12. The Loosle Spring became contaminated and tasted 
"brackishH whenever there was a heavy rain and became contaminated 
and tasted "brackishH during each irrigation season (April through 
October) when water from a nearby ditch seemed to contaminate the 
spring and increase its flow. 
13. In 1982 Loosles, along with Thomas Calvin Thorpe, Vonda 
J. Thorpe (hereafter collectively Thorpe), Von R. Curtis and 
Barbara F. Curtis (hereafter collectively Curtis) (all neighbors) 
entered into a verbal agreement to jointly dig a well on property 
owned by the Curtis' to serve each of the three (3) parties' homes 
and the interest of the Loosles in the well was for the benefit of 
the real property owned by Loosles. The well was dug to the South 
* 
and East of the Property and across Highway 69. It consisted of 
the well, a pump, pump house, reservoir and one water line to serve 
the users. The well drilling was successful and thereafter Thomas 
C. Thorpe filed a Water Appropriation No. 57296 (29-2775) claim on 
the well with the office of the State Engineer of the State of 
Utah. The State Engineer approved the well application for the 
use, among others, of three (3) families (domestic plus .25 acres 
irrigation per family) on September 17, 1982. 
14. Thorpes, Loosles and Curtis' completed piping of the 
water from the well to each of their properties, including the 
Property, in late 1982 or early 1983. 
15. The well and well water right is now the only water right 
available in connection with the Property which is useable year-
round for culinary purposes and which is piped underground to serve 
the same and the plumbing for the home on the Property is designed 
so as to be able to use water from the well. The well water serves 
the Property and home by gravity flow and requires no pumping and 
no electricity to be used. 
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16. The pipeline from the well is initially a four inch (4M) 
line covered by a protective casing and is 4-5 feet deep as it goes 
West from the well to Highway 69. The line then goes underneath 
Highway 69. On the West side of Highway 69 the pipeline splits 
into one (1) line to serve Thorpe (further to the West) and one (1) 
line to serve the Property (to the North) . When it divides to 
serve Thorpe and the Property, the line to the Property is a two 
inch (2") line 4-5 feet deep covered by sand and other soil 
materials to protect it from damage from rocks. 
17. The well pipeline crosses property originally owned by 
Curtis for which there is a deeded easement in favor of Loosles 
evidenced by that Quit Claim Deed dated July 8, 1986 and recorded 
July 8, 1986 in Book 420 at Page 823 in the Office of the Recorder 
of Box Elder County, Utah. The well pipeline then traverses 
property owned by Thorpe and for which there was agreement that 
Thorpe would give Loosles a written deeded easement, although there 
is no evidence such an easement has been executed and delivered. 
The well pipeline from the well to the Property and home was dug 
with the approval and help of Curtis and Thorpe. 
18. The well pipeline connects to the line to the pumphouse 
and to the home on the Property and has a valve system so the well 
water can be used in the home and/or to irrigate, and 
alternatively, by switching a valve, the Loosle Spring water can 
be used in the home and/or to irrigate. 
19. Since late 1982 or early 1983 Loosles have not hand 
carried water into the home and the well water has been used daily 
since then and has been the exclusive source of domestic/culinary 
water. 
20. The Loosle Spring, Loosle Spring water rights, spring 
pump and pumphouse, spring collecting tank, well, well pipeline, 
well pipeline easements, as defined in Finding No. 17, well 
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and 
attachments to the foregoing are all permanent improvements to the 
Property (hereafter collectively referred to as Improvements). 
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21 • The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are 
used beneficially in connection with it and are essential and 
critical to have the Property and home useable and marketable 
without a substantial loss in value. 
22. The Loosle Spring water and well water and water rights 
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Water Rights") are 
appurtenant to the Propertyf are used beneficially in connection 
with it and are essential and critical to have a marketable and 
useable piece of real property and home. Without the Water Rights 
and Improvements the home on the Property has no reasonably useable 
water for culinary purposes and its value would be substantially 
reduced. 
23. By reason of Loosles' default in one or more of the 
installments due under the Note, FirstFed caused a Notice of 
Default to be served upon Loosles. The Notice of Default was 
recorded in the Office of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on 
February 2, 1989 in Book 469 at Page 541. The Notice of Default 
was not cured nor was the obligation and Trust Deed reinstated 
within the time allowed by law. 
24. A Notice of Trustee's Sale dated June 26, 1989 was 
prepared and by reason of Loosles' failure to cure or reinstate the 
Trust Deed, FirstFed caused a Trustee's Sale to be held on Tuesday, 
July 25, 1989 at the Box Elder County Courthouse. 
25. FirstFed, being the highest bidder therefore, bought the 
Property secured by the Trust Deed for Sixty-three Thousand Five 
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($63,500.00). 
26. FirstFed is presently the owner of the following 
described real property which they acquired at the Trustee's Sale 
on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a foreclosure sale against Loosles, 
who were the prior owners of the property: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30M East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48' 30" West 603 
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feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
27. Loosles claim and assert an interest or ownership in the 
Water Rights and Improvements adverse to the claim of FirstFed, and 
such claims of Loosles are without any right whatever, and the 
Loosles have no estate, right, title or interest whatever in said 
Water Rights and Improvements or any part thereof. 
28. Any claims of Loosles to the Water Rights and 
Improvements are void and of no effect because the Water Rights and 
Improvements were pledged by Loosles to FirstFed and then acquired 
by FirstFed as part of the foreclosure (Trustee's Sale) of the 
Property. 
29. FirstFed and the Property have a great need and necessity 
for the Water Rights and Improvements and any and all rights and 
claims of Loosles to Water Rights and Improvements as described are 
void and of no effect and title should be quieted in the current 
record title owner of the Property, FirstFed. 
30. Good Water Rights and successful culinary wells are very 
difficult to find and obtain in the Harper Ward area of Box Elder 
County and there is no city culinary water nearby. 
31. This decision is binding and is a determination of rights 
as to the Water Rights and Improvements ajnd other items indicated 
as between Loosles and FirstFed and not for any rights as to any 
third parties or other parties not before the Court. 
32. There were no documents available at the time of 
execution of the Trust Deed to further evidence title to the Water 
Rights other than as referenced in the Trust Deed. 
33. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the 
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as: (a) it 
applies to improvements on the property either existing or 
subsequent; (b) it applies and pledges certain kinds of property 
interests which will occur and which need not be directly located 
on the Property, such as easements, rights and appurtenances; (c) 
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it includes water and water rights, which often do occur off of the 
property; and (d) it includes fixtures. 
34. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as 
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the 
testimony of the parties and exhibits
 # as to the intentions of the 
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are 
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title 
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and 
after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and 
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and 
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the 
foreclosure sale. 
35. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever 
severed or used their interest in the Well or water from the Well 
on anything but the Property. 
36. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever 
severed or used their interest in the Loosle Spring on anything but 
the Property. 
37. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the 
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for 
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement 
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. 
38. The Loosles were interested in having two (2) sources of 
water to serve the Property, and both sources were pledged to 
FirstFed and any and all interest in said Water Rights and 
Improvements now belong to FirstFed and are part of the Property. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan 
(hereafter FirstFed) is presently the owner of the following 
described real property (hereafter the Property) which they 
acquired at the Trustee's Sale on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a 
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foreclosure sale against Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle 
(hereafter Loosles), who were the prior owners of the Property: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North# Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30M West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30H East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the 
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as it applies to 
improvements on the property either existing or subsequent; 
inasmuch as it applies and pledges certain kinds of property 
interests which will occur and not be located on the Property, such 
as easements, rights and appurtenances; it includes water and water 
rights, which often do occur adjacent to or nearby the Property and 
for fixtures. 
3. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the 
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest then and now of the 
Loosles in and to the Loosle Spring (including but not limited to 
the Application To Appropriate dated May 18, 1988, Application No. 
A63206) and in any documents evidencing any right, title, interest 
or claim is owned by and vested in FirstFed. 
4. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the 
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest of Loosles in the 
well, well water, easements and improvements (including but not 
limited to rights to use of a share of the well under Appropriation 
No. 57296 (29-2775) and in any documents evidencing any right, 
title, interest or claim in said well, well water, easements and 
improvements is owned by and vested in FirstFed. 
5. The Loosles' sole reason for the Well, easements and the 
improvements to the water system and the establishment of the Well 
water rights was for the improvement and benefit of the Property. 
6. The Loosle Spring, spring pump and pumphouse, spring 
collecting tank, well, well pipeline, well pipeline easements, well 
10 
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and 
improvements and attachments to the foregoing are all permanent 
improvements to the Property (hereafter collectively referred to 
as Improvements). 
7. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are used 
beneficially in connection with it and are essential and critical 
to have the Property and home useable and marketable without a 
substantial loss in value. 
8. The Loosle Spring water and well water (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "Water Rights") "are appurtenant to the | 
Property, are used beneficially in connection with it and are 
essential and critical to the use and marketing of the Property I 
and home. Without the Water Rights and Improvements the home on 
the Property has no reasonably useable water for culinary purposes 
and its value would be substantially reduced. 
9. Any and all rights and claims of Loosles to Water Rights j 
and Improvements as described are null and void and of no effect 
and title should be quieted in the current record title owner of i 
the Property, FirstFed. j 
10. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as I 
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the j 
testimony of the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the 
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are 
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title 
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and \ 
i 
after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and •. 
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and ! 
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the j 
foreclosure sale. I 
11. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the I 
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for j 
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvernent i 
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. j 
11 
12. The claims, right, title and interest of FirstFed in and 
to said Water Rights and Improvements is superior, free and clear 
of any title or claim of Loosles and all claims of Loosles are null 
and void and Loosles should be decreed to have no estate in, 
interest in, lien or encumbrance upon or right of use or sale of 
said Water Rights and Improvements. 
13. Loosles should be forever barred, enjoined and restrained 
from making or asserting any claim or interest in or to FirstFed's 
Water Rights and Improvements or clouding any portion thereof or 
in any way questioning, disturbing or attempting to disturb or 
interfere with the referenced Water Rights and Improvements. 
DONE in open Court this 15th day of June, 1990 and signed in 
open Court this / day of .Juiffil 1990. 
<LJ± 
FT'L. Gunnel 1 
District Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that I hand delivered an exact copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law to Plaintiffs' 
Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, 29 South Main Street, 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
Miles P. Jensen (#1686) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
56 West Center 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and 
THERESA L. LOOSLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, ALL PRO 
REAL ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah. 
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS 
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation, 
and WILLIAM L. PACKER dba QUALITY 
BUILDERS, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 890000213CA 
This matter came on for hearing at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on 
Friday, June 15, 1990, in the Court Room in the County Courthouse 
at Brigham, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell 
presiding. The matter in issue was Defendant First Federal Savings 
and Loan Association of Logan's Complaint dated March 8, 1990, 
originally filed as Civil No. 900000129, now consolidated with 
Civil No. 890000213CA. The Plaintiffs were present in person and 
were represented by their counsel, Dale M. Dorius, and Defendant, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, was present and 
represented by its counsel, Olson & Hoggan, Miles P. Jensen, and 
the parties having called certain witnesses, introduced certain 
exhibits, and having made certain arguments to the Court, and the 
Court being fully advised in the matter, and having heard the 
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testimony, reviewed the exhibits and other documents on file, and 
having issued its oral decision from the Bench, and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the Court hereby makes the following: 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan 
(hereafter FirstFed) is presently the owner of the following 
described real property (hereafter the Property) which they 
acquired at a Trustee's Sale on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a Trust 
Deed foreclosure against Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle 
(hereafter Loosles), who were the prior owners of the Property: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast -corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'SO" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30H West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. Pursuant to a loan from FirstFed to Loosles, Loosles made, 
executed and delivered to FirstFed that certain Trust Deed dated 
September 16, 1980 (hereafter Trust Deed) and recorded in the 
Office of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on September 17, 
1980 as Entry No. 80733H in Book 336 at Page 382 which Trust Deed 
was the basis for the foreclosure and Trustee's Sale above 
described and which Trust Deed pledged: 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances. rents (subject however to the rights and 
authorities given herein to Lender to coalleet and apply 
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and 
profits, water, water rights, and water stock, and all 
of which, including replacements and additions thereto, 
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property 
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing, 
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if 
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred 
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.) 
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3. The language of the Trust Deed cited in paragraph 2 
applies to improvements on the property either existing or 
subsequent; applies and pledges certain kinds of property interests 
which will occur and not be located on the Property, such as 
easements, rights and appurtenances - includes water and water 
rights, which often do occur adjacent to or nearby the Property and 
includes fixtures. 
4. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the 
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest then and now of the 
Loosles in and to the Loosle Spring (including but not limited to 
the Application To Appropriate dated May 18, 1988, Application No. 
A63206) and in any documents evidencing any right, title, interest 
or claim is owned by and vested in FirstFed. 
5. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the 
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest of Loosles in the 
well, well water, easements and improvements (including but not 
limited to rights to use of a share of the well under Appropriation 
No, 57296 (29-2775) and in any documents evidencing any right, 
title, interest or claim in said well, well water, easements and 
improvements is owned by and vested in FirstFed. 
6. The Loosles' sole reason for the Well, easements and the 
improvements to the water system and the establishment of the Well 
water rights was for the improvement and benefit of the Property. 
7. The Loosle Spring, spring pump and pumphouse, spring 
collecting tank, well, well pipeline, well pipeline easements, well 
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and 
improvements and attachments to the foregoing are all permanent 
improvements to the Property (hereafter collectively referred to 
as Improvements). 
8. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are used 
beneficially in connection with it and are essential and critical 
to have the Property and home useable and marketable without a 
substantial loss in value. 
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9. The Loosle Spring water and well water (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "Water Rights") are appurtenant to the 
Property, are used beneficially in connection with it and are 
essential and critical to the use and marketing of the Property and 
home. Without the Water Rights and Improvements the home on the 
Property has no reasonably useable water for culinary purposes and 
its value would be substantially reduced. 
10. Any and all rights and claims of Loosles to Water Rights 
and Improvements as described are null and void and of no effect 
and title is hereby quieted in the current record title owner of 
the Property, FirstFed. 
11. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as 
interpreted and applied to this case and based on the testimony of 
the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the Loosles, 
indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are covered by the 
language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title and interest 
of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and any and all after 
acquired right, title and interest of the Loosles in and to Water 
Rights and Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, 
title and interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase 
at the Trustee's Sale described in paragraph 1, above. 
12. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the 
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for 
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement 
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. 
13. The claims, right, title and interest of FirstFed in and 
to said Water Rights and Improvements is superior, free and clear 
of any title or claim of Loosles and all claims of Loosles are null 
and void and Loosles are hereby decreed to have no estate in, 
interest in, lien or encumbrance upon or right of use or sale of 
said Water Rights and Improvements• 
14. Loosles are forever barred, enjoined and restrained from 
making or asserting any claim or interest in or to FirstFed's Water 
Rights and Improvements or clouding any portion thereof or in any 
way questioning, disturbing or attempting to disturb or interfere 
with the referenced Water Rights and Improvements. 
DONE in open Court the 15th day of June, 1990 and signed this 
l_ day of Jtt¥r^ < 1990. 
F. L. Bunnell 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered an exact copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law to Plaintiffs' 
Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, 29 South Main Street, 
Brigham City, Utah 84302, this 16th day of July, 1990. 
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